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Abstract
This study explores the e¤ects of patent protection in an R&D-based growth model
with nancial frictions. We 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es innovation depends on credit constraints faced by R&D entrepreneurs. When credit
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R&D. The overall e¤ect of patent protection on innovation follows an inverted-U pattern.
By relaxing the credit constraints, 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nd sup-
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1 Introduction
In this study, we explore the e¤ects of patent protection in an R&D-based growth model. Our
growth-theoretic analysis of patent policy features nancial frictions in the form of potentially
binding credit constraints on R&D entrepreneurs. As in Aghion et al. (2005), due to moral
hazard, R&D entrepreneurs may not be able to borrow as much as they want for their R&D
investment. When these credit constraints are non-binding, we nd that strengthening patent
protection by increasing patent breadth leads to a larger amount of monopolistic prot, which
stimulates R&D and technological progress. This positive monopolistic-prot e¤ect captures the
traditional view of patent protection. However, when the credit constraints are binding, we nd
that the monopolistic distortion arising from patent protection leads to more severe nancial
frictions, which stie R&D and slow down technological progress. We refer to this e¤ect as a
negative nancial distortionary e¤ect of patent protection.
The intuition of this nancial distortionary e¤ect can be explained as follows. As in the sem-
inal study by Nordhaus (1969), patent protection causes monopolistic distortion, which in turn
reduces aggregate income in general equilibrium and tightens credit constraints faced by R&D
entrepreneurs in the presence of nancial frictions. Our mechanics relies on credit constraints to
make R&D a constant fraction of aggregate income. Then, the monopolistic distortion of patent
protection on aggregate income reduces R&D and economic growth when credit constraints are
binding. Hence we nd that credit constraints jeopardize the classical Schumpeterian trade-o¤
between static and dynamic e¢ ciency: less static e¢ ciency (i.e., lower output) by causing less
R&D entails less dynamic e¢ ciency (i.e., lower growth). In this case, stronger patent protection
reduces the rates of innovation and economic growth, in addition to reducing the level of output.
This nding is consistent with recent studies that often nd the presence of negative e¤ects
of patent protection on innovation.1 Furthermore, we nd that the positive monopolistic-prot
e¤ect of patent protection prevails when the level of patent protection is below a threshold value,
whereas the negative nancial distortionary e¤ect of patent protection prevails when the level
of patent protection is above the threshold. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of patent protection on
R&D and innovation follows an inverted-U pattern that is commonly found in empirical studies.2
We consider the case in which a higher level of nancial development relaxes credit constraints
by making it more di¢ cult for borrowers to defraud. As in Aghion et al. (2005), we nd that
a higher level of nancial development stimulates innovation. Intuitively, when R&D entrepre-
neurs are less likely to defraud, banks are more willing to lend to them for R&D investment.
Furthermore, we have a novel nding that patent protection is more likely to have a positive
e¤ect on innovation under a higher level of nancial development. The intuition of this result
can be explained as follows. When banks become more willing to lend to R&D entrepreneurs,
the credit constraints are less likely to be binding, in which case patent protection has a positive
e¤ect on innovation.
We test this theoretical implication using cross-country panel regression. We nd that patent
protection and nancial development have a positive interaction e¤ect on innovation. Ang (2010,
2011) also empirically explores the e¤ects of patent protection and nancial development on R&D
activities. We complement the analysis in Ang (2010, 2011) by considering the interaction e¤ect
1See for example Ja¤e and Lerner (2004), Bessen and Meurer (2008) and Boldrin and Levine (2008).
2See for example Qian (2007) and Lerner (2009).
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of patent protection and nancial development on economic growth. Their positive interaction
e¤ect on innovation is consistent with our theoretical nding that patent protection is more likely
to have a positive e¤ect on innovation under a higher level of nancial development. Therefore,
to capture the complete e¤ects of patent policy on economic growth, it is useful to explore how
the e¤ect of patent protection changes under di¤erent levels of nancial development.
This study relates to the literature on patent policy. In this literature, Nordhaus (1969)
provides the seminal study in which he shows that increasing patent length causes a positive
e¤ect on innovation and a negative static distortionary e¤ect on welfare. While Nordhaus (1969)
focuses on a partial-equilibrium framework, we consider a dynamic general-equilibrium (DGE)
model in which the monopolistic distortion caused by patent protection interacts with nancial
frictions to a¤ect credit constraints and stie innovation. Subsequent studies in this literature,
such as Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990), explore patent breadth in addition to
patent length. Scotchmer (2004) provides a comprehensive review of this patent-design literature.
Our study instead explores the e¤ects of patent policy in a DGE model in which the nancial
distortionary e¤ect of patent policy arises through a general-equilibrium channel. Therefore, this
study relates more closely to the macroeconomic literature on patent policy and economic growth
based on DGE models.
The seminal DGE analysis of patent policy is Judd (1985), who nds that an innite patent
length maximizes innovation and eliminates the relative-price distortion because all industries
charge the same markup. Our model features an innite patent length under which the relative-
price distortion is absent as in Judd (1985).3 However, we show that patent breadth interacts
with a nancial distortion that a¤ects credit constraints and R&D. Subsequent studies in this
literature explore patent breadth as an alternative patent-policy instrument; see for example, Li
(2001), Goh and Olivier (2002) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013).4 Some of these studies also
nd that strengthening patent protection has an inverted-U e¤ect on innovation and growth.
Our study di¤ers from these previous studies by exploring the e¤ects of patent protection in
the presence of nancial frictions. In other words, we analyze the interaction between patent
protection and credit constraints, which is the novel contribution of this study.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents stylized facts. Section 3
describes the R&D-based growth model. Section 4 presents theoretical results. The nal section
concludes.
2 Stylized facts
In this section, we document the empirical relationship between patent protection, nancial
development and economic growth. Specically, we use cross-country panel data, which consist
3Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) also show that the optimal patent length is innite and argue that "the policy
margin of patent length is not a useful one on which to operate."
4For other patent-policy instruments, see ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) and Kiedaisch (2015) on
patentability requirement, Furukawa (2007), Horii and Iwaisako (2007) and Chu, Cozzi and Galli (2014) on
protection against imitation, Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007) and Davis and Sener (2012) on rent protection
activities, and Chu (2009), Chu, Cozzi and Galli (2012), Chu and Pan (2013) and Cozzi and Galli (2014) on
blocking patents. None of these studies consider nancial frictions.
3
of 48 countries from 1998 to 2014. We consider the following empirical specication:
Growthi;t+1 = 0 + 1IPRi;t + 2IPRi;t  FDi;t +  i;t + i + t + "i;t,
where Growthi;t+1 is the growth rate of GDP or per capita GDP in country i, IPRi;t is an index
of patent protection, and FDi;t is the level of nancial development. i;t denotes a vector of
the following control variables: FDi;t, the degree of openness, the unemployment rate and the
quality of institutions.5 Specically, the degree of openness is dened as the sum of exports and
imports as a share of GDP, whereas the quality of institutions is measured by investment risks
from the International Country Risk Guide.6 i is the country xed e¤ects. t is the year xed
e¤ects.
We use the index of patent strength constructed by Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) to measure
the level of patent protection.7 This patent index has the following advantages. First, obser-
vations are available at annual frequency.8 Second, the index captures patent enforcement in
addition to the strength of statutory protection.9
For the measurement of nancial development, we follow King and Levine (1993), Beck et al.
(2010) and Manova (2013) to use the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other
nancial institutions to GDP, denoted by private credit, as a proxy for the overall development
of a countrys nancial system.10 As stated in Levine et al. (2000), private credit excludes credit
granted to the public sector and credit granted by the central bank and development banks, and
hence, it better captures the overall level of nancial development. In addition, we also use the
ratio of deposit money banksassets to GDP, denoted by bank assets, as a robustness check. Data
for these two variables can be obtained from the Global Financial Development Database.11
Di¤erentiating the rate of economic growth with respect to IPR yields
@Growthi;t+1
@IPRi;t
= 1 + 2FDi;t.
Our theoretical model in the subsequent sections predicts that 1 < 0 and 2 > 0. In other words,
for a country that has a low level of nancial development (i.e., a small FDi;t), the e¤ect of IPR
on economic growth is negative. For a country that has a high level of nancial development
(i.e., a large FDi;t), the e¤ect of IPR on economic growth becomes positive.
Table 1 reports our benchmark results. In the rst two columns, nancial development is
measured by private credit, whereas in the last two columns, it is measured by bank assets. In
some columns, Growthi;t+1 is measured by the growth rate of GDP. In other columns, Growthi;t+1
is measured by the growth rate of GDP per capita. As shown in the Table 1, all the coe¢ cients
of the interaction term between patent protection and nancial development are positive and
signicant, whereas the coe¢ cients of patent protection are all negative and signicant.12 We
5See Appendix A for a detailed description and sources of the data.
6See Fan and Gao (2017) who also use this index to measure the quality of institutions.
7Data available at: https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/management/research/projects/patent-systems/
8Another inuential patent index in the literature is the Ginarte-Park index in Ginarte and Park (1997) and
Park (2008). However, this index is only available quinquennially.
9See Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) for a detailed discussion.
10If we use the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP instead, the results are similar.
11Data available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/gfdr/data/nancial-structure-database
12To mitigate the problem of endogeneity, we have also used the lagged values of IPR and FD as their instru-
mental variables and nd that our results (available upon request) still hold.
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also run a t-test on patent protection and its interaction with nancial development, which shows
that the e¤ect of patent protection on economic growth is negative and signicant for countries
with the lowest level of nancial development (positive and signicant for countries with the
highest level of nancial development). To verify the validity of our results, we also drop the
highest and lowest one-percent outliers of IPR from our sample. As shown in Table 2, the results
are similar.
Table 1: E¤ects of patent protection on economic growth
private credit bank assets
GDP GDP per capita GDP GDP per capita
IPR  FD 0.931*** 0.886*** 0.708*** 0.676***
(0.268) (0.254) (0.272) (0.261)
IPR -0.878** -0.863** -0.937** -0.927**
(0.362) (0.363) (0.399) (0.399)
other controls yes yes yes yes
country xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
year xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
observations 776 776 776 776
R-squared 0.569 0.540 0.559 0.529
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. IPR denotes the index of patent protection. FD denotes the level of
nancial development. Other control variables include FD, the degree of openness, the unemployment rate and
the quality of institutions. In the rst two columns, nancial development is measured by private credit, whereas
in the last two columns it is measured by bank assets. The dependent variable is economic growth measured by
either the growth rate of GDP or the growth rate of GDP per capita. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 2: E¤ects of patent protection (removing outliers)
private credit bank assets
GDP GDP per capita GDP GDP per capita
IPR  FD 0.930*** 0.878*** 0.708** 0.673**
(0.311) (0.290) (0.311) (0.295)
IPR -0.950** -0.920** -1.004** -0.983**
(0.381) (0.381) (0.423) (0.422)
other controls yes yes yes yes
country xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
year xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
observations 762 762 762 762
R-squared 0.572 0.541 0.561 0.530
Note: In this table, we drop the highest and lowest one-percent outliers of IPR. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01. IPR denotes the index of patent protection. FD denotes the level of nancial development. Other control
variables include FD, the degree of openness, the unemployment rate and the quality of institutions. In the rst
two columns, nancial development is measured by private credit, whereas in the last two columns it is measured
by bank assets. The dependent variable is economic growth measured by either the growth rate of GDP or the
growth rate of GDP per capita. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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3 An R&D-based growth model with credit frictions
The R&D-based growth model originates from the seminal work by Romer (1990). In this
section, we consider a discrete-time version and follow Aghion et al. (2005) to incorporate
nancial frictions into the Romer model.
3.1 Households and workers/entrepreneurs
There is a unit continuum of innitely-lived households. These households own intangible capital
(in the form of patents that generate monopolistic prots) and consume nal good (numeraire).
The lifetime utility function of a household is given by
U =
1P
t=0
Ct
(1 + )t
,
where the parameter  > 0 is the subjective discount rate and Ct is consumption of the household
at time t. The asset-accumulation equation is At+1 = (1 + rt)At   Ct. From standard dynamic
optimization, the linear utility function implies that in equilibrium the real interest rate is equal
to the discount rate, such that rt =  for all t.
In addition to the innitely-lived households in the economy, we follow previous studies to
assume the presence of overlapping generations of workers/entrepreneurs in each period to create
a need for the entrepreneurs to borrow funding for R&D. At the beginning of each period t, L
workers enter the economy, and they work to earn wageWt. At the end of the period, each worker
becomes an entrepreneur and devotes part of her wage income Wt to R&D, where  2 (0; 1].13
At the beginning of the next period, those entrepreneurs who have succeeded in their R&D
projects sell their inventions to households and use the proceeds for consumption. Without loss
of generality, we normalize L to unity. A worker who enters the economy in period t has the
utility function ut = yt+Et[ot+1]=(1+), where yt denotes consumption when young and Et[ot+1]
denotes expected consumption when old. If the amount of her R&D spending Zt is less than
Wt, then a worker/entrepreneur simply consumes Wt Zt in period t or saves part of it subject
to the market interest rate rt. However, if Zt > Wt, then the worker/entrepreneur would need
to apply for a loan subject to credit constraints, which will be described in details in Section 3.7.
3.2 Final good
The nal-good sector is perfectly competitive. Firms in this sector employ workers and use a
mass of di¤erentiated intermediate goods v 2 [0; Nt] to produce nal good using the following
production function:
Yt = (Lt)
1 
Z Nt
0
[xt (v)]
dv, (1)
where the parameter  2 (0; 1) determines labor intensity 1    in production. Lt is labor
input. xt (v) is the amount of intermediate good v 2 [0; Nt], and Nt is the number of available
13Here we assume that the entrepreneur may not be able to devote her entire wage income to R&D. Our results
also hold when  = 1.
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intermediate goods at time t. Competitive rms take the prices of nal good and factor inputs as
given to maximize prot. The conditional labor demand function is given by Wt = (1 )Yt=Lt,
where Lt = L = 1 from the market-clearing condition. The conditional demand function for
intermediate good v is given by
xt (v) =


pt (v)
1=(1 )
, (2)
where pt (v) is the price of intermediate good v.
3.3 Intermediate goods
Each di¤erentiated intermediate good v is produced by a rm that owns the patent of the product
and has market power, which is determined by the level of patent protection to be explained
below. In industry v, the rm produces xt (v) units of intermediate goods using xt (v) units of
nal good as inputs. Therefore, the prot function of the rm in industry v is
t (v) = pt (v)xt (v)  xt (v) = [pt (v)  1]


pt (v)
1=(1 )
, (3)
where the second equality follows from (2).
Using (3), one can derive the prot-maximizing price pt (v) given by 1=. To capture the
e¤ects of patent protection, we follow Goh and Olivier (2002) to model patent breadth  2
(1; 1=) as a policy parameter. The idea is that the unit cost for imitative rms to produce xt (v)
is , which is assumed to be increasing in the level of patent protection. Therefore, a larger
patent breadth  allows the monopolistic producer of xt (v), who owns the patent, to charge a
higher markup without losing her market share.14 In this case,
pt (v) = . (4)
Combining (3) and (4), we obtain the amount of prot as a function of patent breadth given by
t (v) = (   1)



1=(1 )
 (), (5)
which is increasing in patent breadth  for  < 1=.
14See also Li (2001) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013) for a similar formulation. This formulation captures
Gilbert and Shapiros (1990) insight on breadth as the ability of the patentee to raise price and originates
from the patent-design literature; see for example Gallini (1992) who considers the case in which a larger patent
breadth increases the imitation cost of imitators.
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3.4 Aggregate production function
Substituting (2) and (4) into (1) yields
Yt =



=(1 )
Nt. (6)
Equation (6) shows that the growth rate of Yt is determined by the growth rate of Nt. Fur-
thermore, for a given Nt, the level of Yt is decreasing in patent breadth , which captures the
e¤ect of markup distortion on the level of output.15 In other words, by increasing the price of
intermediate goods, a larger markup leads to less intermediate goods being produced and also
less nal good being produced.16 In the presence of credit constraints, patent protection would
then generate a negative e¤ect on R&D as a result of this markup distortion as we will show
later.
3.5 R&D and the value of patents
There is an R&D sector. In each period t, workers/entrepreneurs devote nal good to R&D at
the end of the period to invent new intermediate goods that will be produced in the next period.
To ensure balanced growth, we assume that each entrepreneur spreads her R&D spending Zt
over Nt R&D projects.17 Therefore, the amount of nal good that an entrepreneur devotes to
each of her R&D projects is Zt=Nt, and the probability of her R&D projects being successful is
Pt = minfZt=(Ntt); 1g,18 where 1=t captures the productivity in R&D. We adopt the following
specication for t:
t = 

Zt
Nt

, (7)
where  > 0 and  2 (0; 1). The term (Zt=Nt) captures an intratemporal duplication externality
of R&D as in Jones and Williams (2000). Given the unit continuum of R&D entrepreneurs and
the independence of R&D projects (across entrepreneurs), the law of large numbers applies, so
that the accumulation of inventions at the aggregate level follows a deterministic process given
by
Nt  Nt+1  Nt = Zt
t
=
Nt


Zt
Nt
1 
, (8)
15Here we assume that a change in patent policy applies to all patents. If the policy change applies to only new
patents, then its distortionary e¤ects would gradually arise, rather than occurring immediately. Furthermore,
there will be an additional relative-price distortion because old and new patented goods have di¤erent markups.
16This distortionary e¤ect would be absent if xt (v) were produced from a xed factor input instead of the nal
good. However, if we follow Romer (1990) to assume that intermediate goods are produced from capital, then the
markup distortion would still exist because the presence of markup and prots lowers capital income and reduces
capital accumulation. For example, Chu (2010) uses US data to calibrate a generalized version of the Romer
model to quantify the distortionary e¤ect of the patent system and nds that increasing the patent length could
lead to a non-negligible decrease in capital investment.
17To ensure the innovation probability Pt  1 in the presence of growth in Zt, we only need to assume that
entrepreneurs spread their R&D spending Zt over &Nt R&D projects, where & > 0. Without loss of generality,
we set & = 1.
18For simplicity, we assume that an entrepreneurs R&D projects either all succeed or all fail.
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where Zt=t = NtZt=(Ntt) is the number of successful R&D projects in period t.
Each R&D project has a probability Pt to give rise to a new variety of intermediate goods.
When a new variety is successfully invented at the end of period t, production of the intermediate
goods begins in period t + 1. We denote the value of an invention created in period t as Vt (v).
The discount rate for future prots is given by rt =  for all t. Vt (v) can be expressed as
Vt (v) =
1P
s=t
s+1 (v)
(1 + r)s+1 t
=
 ()

, (9)
which is increasing in patent breadth . The positive e¤ect of  captures the positive e¤ect of
patent protection on the value of inventions.
3.6 Equilibrium without credit constraints
In this section, we explore the equilibrium level of R&D in the absence of credit constraints. The
zero-expected-prot condition of R&D is given by PtVt = Zt=Nt, which can be expressed as
Vt = t ,
()

= 

Zt
Nt

. (10)
Therefore, the level of R&D at time t is given by
Zt =

()

1=
Nt, (11)
which is increasing in . The growth rate of technology in the absence of credit constraints is
given by
Nt
Nt
=
1


Zt
Nt
1 
=
1
1=

()

(1 )=
 g1. (12)
The growth rate g1 in (12) is increasing in patent breadth  capturing the positive monopolistic
prot e¤ect of patent protection on innovation. Proposition 1 summarizes this result, which is
often found in the literature; see for example Judd (1985), Li (2001), ODonoghue and Zweimuller
(2004) and Horii and Iwaisako (2007).
Proposition 1 In the absence of credit constraints, stronger patent protection leads to a higher
growth rate of technology.
Proof. Use (5) and (12) to show that g1 is increasing in .
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3.7 Equilibrium with credit constraints
Before the end of a period, each entrepreneur devotes her wage income Wt to Nt R&D projects
without borrowing. If the R&D spending Zt exceeds her wage income Wt, then she would have
to borrow Dt = Zt Wt from a bank to nance her R&D projects. If her R&D projects succeed,
she repays the loan plus an interest payment equal to (1 + Rt+1)Dt at the end of the period. If
her R&D projects fail, she becomes bankrupt and repays nothing to the bank. Therefore, if the
entrepreneur truthfully reveals the outcome of her R&D projects, the expected payment received
by the bank is Pt(1 + Rt+1)Dt + (1   Pt)0. When banks make zero expected prot, we have
Pt(1 +Rt+1)Dt = Dt, which implies Pt(1 +Rt+1) = 1. In other words, a higher probability Pt of
R&D success reduces the interest rate Rt+1 charged by competitive banks.
What makes it di¢ cult to borrow is that an entrepreneur may want to default even when her
projects are successful. As in Aghion et al. (2005), banks do not observe the outcome of R&D
projects, and hence, the problem of moral hazard arises.19 Specically, by paying a hiding cost
hZt where h 2 (0; 1), an entrepreneur can hide the outcome of her projects and avoid repaying
the loan. The cost parameter h is an indicator of bankse¤ectiveness in securing repayment
and measures the level of nancial development. We follow Aghion et al. (2005) to assume that
in case an entrepreneur decides to defraud, the entrepreneur must incur the hiding cost before
observing the outcome of her R&D projects. Therefore, entrepreneurs would not defraud if and
only if the following incentive-compatibility (IC) constraint holds:
hZt  Pt(1 +Rt+1)Dt = Dt, (13)
where Dt = Zt   Wt = Zt   (1  )Yt. Substituting this condition into (13) yields
Zt  (1  )Yt
1  h =
(1  )
1  h



=(1 )
Nt, (14)
where the last equality uses (6). We refer to this IC constraint as a credit constraint, which
becomes tighter as patent breadth  increases capturing an interaction between the monopolistic
distortion of patent protection and the nancial distortion of the credit constraint. The intuition
can be explained as follows. When patent breadth  increases, aggregate income Y decreases
due to the markup distortion. As a result, a larger  reduces the income of entrepreneurs and
their ability to borrow for R&D. This interaction e¤ect exists so long as entrepreneursability
to borrow is a¤ected by their income and in turn entrepreneursincome is related to aggregate
income.
For convenience, we dene f  (1   )=(1   h) 2 (0;1) as a composite parameter that
is increasing in the hiding cost h. Then, substituting (14) into (8) yields the growth rate of
technology, in the presence of a binding credit constraint, as follows:
Nt
Nt
=
1

"


=(1 )
f
#1 
 g2. (15)
19As in Aghion et al. (2005), we do not consider the case in which patents can be used as collateral. To be
more precise, we assume that future patents cannot be used as collateral because R&D projects have not been
completed as the stage of borrowing. See Amable et al. (2010) for an interesting analysis on patents as collateral.
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The equilibrium growth rate g2 in (15) is decreasing in the level of patent breadth  capturing the
abovementioned nancial distortionary e¤ect of patent protection on innovation. Furthermore,
a higher level of nancial development f reected by a larger hiding cost increases the growth
rate of technology as in Aghion et al. (2005).20 We summarize these results in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 In the presence of binding credit constraints, stronger patent protection leads to
a lower growth rate of technology. A higher level of nancial development leads to a higher growth
rate of technology.
Proof. Use (15) to show that g2 is decreasing in  and increasing in f .
In the previous section, we nd that when the credit constraint is not binding, our model
features the classic trade-o¤of patent protection that yields a static loss in output and a dynamic
gain in growth. In this section, we show that when the credit constraint becomes binding, this
trade-o¤ disappears. Specically, the dynamic gain becomes a dynamic loss in growth whereas
the static loss in output is still present.
Equations (11) and (14) show that the equilibrium level of R&D spending Zt satises
Zt = min
(
()

1=
;



=(1 )
f
)
Nt. (16)
There exists a unique value of patent breadth  below (above) which the credit constraint does
not bind (is binding) in the long run. Equating [()=()]1= and (=)=(1 )f yields this
threshold value , which is determined by
(   1)



(1 )=(1 )
= f , (17)
where the left-hand side of (17) is increasing in . Therefore, the threshold value  is increasing
in f . The intuition of this result can be explained as follows. A larger hiding cost reduces
entrepreneursincentives to defraud and enables them to borrow more funding for R&D. In this
case, the credit constraint is less likely to be binding, which in turn increases the threshold value
of patent breadth.
4 Patent breadth and credit constraints
Based on the results in the previous section, we can consider two scenarios. First, the level of
patent breadth satises  < , where the threshold  is derived in (17). Second, the level of
20If nancial friction is modeled as screening of R&D projects as in Aghion and Howitt (2009, chapter 6) instead
of credit constraints, then nancial development would still stimulate innovation. However, patent breadth would
no longer have a negative e¤ect on innovation due to the absence of credit constraints. In reality, nancial
development should a¤ect the screening of R&D projects and the tightness of credit constraints. So long as credit
constraints are present, the negative e¤ect of patent breadth on innovation would exist whenever they are binding.
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patent breadth satises  > . According to this classication, the equilibrium growth rate is
given by
g =
8<: g1(+); if  < 
(f
+
)
g2(
 
; f
+
); if  > (f
+
)
. (18)
We summarize these results in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 When the level of patent protection is below , the equilibrium growth rate is
increasing in patent breadth. When the level of patent protection is above , the equilibrium
growth rate is decreasing in patent breadth and increasing in the hiding cost. The overall e¤ect
of patent breadth on the equilibrium growth rate follows an inverted-U pattern, and the growth-
maximizing level of patent breath is increasing in the level of nancial development.
Proof. Use (18) to show that (a) g2 is increasing in f and (b) g is initially increasing in  and
then becomes decreasing in  after passing the threshold . Then, use (17) to show that  is
increasing in f .
When the level of patent protection is below , entrepreneurs are not nancially constrained.
In this case, stronger patent protection increases the amount of monopolistic prot, which in turn
stimulates R&D and increases the equilibrium growth rate. When the level of patent protection is
above , entrepreneurs become nancially constrained. In this case, stronger patent protection
amplies monopolistic distortion and reduces the level of output, which in turn tightens the
credit constraint on R&D and decreases the equilibrium growth rate. A higher level of nancial
development increases the hiding cost, which in turn enables the entrepreneurs to borrow more
funding for R&D and increases the equilibrium growth rate.
For a given hiding cost, an increase in the level of patent protection may cause the nancial
constraint to change from non-binding to binding; therefore, there exists a growth-maximizing
level of patent protection . This growth-maximizing level of patent protection  is determined
by the level of nancial development f . Specically,  is increasing in f . Therefore, as a
country becomes more nancially developed, it should implement a stronger patent system to
stimulate innovation. Intuitively, as mentioned before, a larger hiding cost reduces entrepreneurs
incentives to defraud, which enables them to borrow more funding for R&D. In this case, the
credit constraint is less likely to be binding, which in turn increases the threshold value  of
patent breadth and renders patent protection more likely to have a positive e¤ect on R&D. We
summarize this result in Proposition 4, which is consistent with the stylized facts in Section 2.
Proposition 4 Patent protection is more likely to have a positive e¤ect on innovation under a
higher level of nancial development.
Proof. Because  is increasing in f as shown in (17), a larger f expands the range of  in
which g is increasing in .
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4.1 Extensions
In this section, we consider an alternative assumption under which R&D entrepreneursability
to borrow depends on prot income in addition to wage income. For simplicity, we assume  = 1;
in other words, the entrepreneurs can devote to R&D projects the entire amount of wage income
Wt and prot income ()Nt.21 In this case, the amount of borrowing becomes
Dt = Zt   [Wt + ()Nt] = Zt   [(1  )Yt + ()Nt] . (19)
As a result, the IC constraint hZt  Dt can be expressed as
Zt  1
1  h [(1  )Yt + ()Nt] =
1
1  h
"
(1  )



=(1 )
+ ()
#
Nt. (20)
Substituting (20) into (8) yields the growth rate of technology under a binding credit constraint
as follows:
Nt
Nt
=
1


1
1  h
()
1 
, (21)
where 
()  (1   ) (=)=(1 ) + () = (=  1) (=)1=(1 ) > 0. Di¤erentiating 
()
with respect to  yields
@
()
@
= 
()

1
     
1
   

< 0. (22)
Therefore, under a binding credit constraint, the equilibrium growth rate is decreasing in patent
breadth even when the entrepreneurs can also devote prot income into R&D. Intuitively, the
negative e¤ect of patent protection on wage income dominates its positive e¤ect on prot income
in our model.
However, if entrepreneurs can use the value of existing patents, instead of just current prot
income, as means of internal nance, then the positive e¤ect of patent protection on the value of
patents may relax the credit constraint. To explore this scenario, we consider another assumption
under which R&D entrepreneursability to borrow depends on the value of patents in addition
to wage income. In this case, the amount of borrowing becomes
Dt = Zt   [Wt + VtNt] = Zt  

(1  )Yt + ()Nt


. (23)
As a result, the IC constraint hZt  Dt can be expressed as
Zt  1
1  h

(1  )Yt + ()Nt


=
1
1  h
"
(1  )



=(1 )
+
()

#
Nt. (24)
Substituting (24) into (8) yields the growth rate of technology under a binding credit constraint
as follows:
Nt
Nt
=
1


1
1  h	()
1 
, (25)
21This is also equal to the interest income rtAt = VtNt = ()Nt.
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where
	() 

1  

 +
   1




1=(1 )
> 0. (26)
Di¤erentiating 	() with respect to  yields
@	()
@
= 	()

(1  )= + 1=
(1  )= + (   1)=  
1
   

, (27)
which is negative if and only if
 >
1  
    2 (0; 1). (28)
Even if we consider a conservatively low annual discount rate of 3.5% and 20 years for one
generation, then the discount rate  would be equal to (1 + 0:035)20   1 = 0:99, which in turn
implies that the above inequality is likely to hold. Therefore, this section conrms the robustness
of our theoretical results.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we have explored the e¤ects of patent protection and nancial development on eco-
nomic growth. We nd that whether strengthening patent protection has a positive or negative
e¤ect on technological progress depends on credit constraints. When credit constraints are not
binding, strengthening patent protection has a positive e¤ect on economic growth. When credit
constraints are binding, strengthening patent protection has a negative e¤ect on growth. An
increase in the level of patent protection may cause the credit constraints to become binding. As
a result, the overall e¤ect of patent protection on economic growth follows an inverted-U pattern.
A higher level of nancial development relaxes credit constraints by increasing the hiding cost.
As a result, a higher level of nancial development stimulates innovation. Furthermore, patent
protection is more likely to have a positive e¤ect on innovation under a higher level of nancial
development. Our regression results show that strengthening patent protection is indeed more
likely to have a positive e¤ect on innovation under a higher level of nancial development. There-
fore, this study shows the importance of an often neglected interaction between the monopolistic
distortion caused by patent protection and the nancial distortion caused by credit constraints.
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Appendix A: Description of the dataset
The empirical analysis is based on a panel dataset for 48 countries from 1998 to 2014. Vari-
ables used in the regressions are listed below with denitions and data sources.
 Growthi;t+1: the rate of economic growth. There are two measures: 1) annual growth rate
of GDP per capita; and 2) annual growth rate of GDP. Source: World Bank Database.
 IPRi;t: an index of patent protection. Source: Papageorgiadis et al. (2014).
 FDi;t: the level of nancial development. There are two measures: 1) private credit by
deposit money banks and other nancial institutions as a share of GDP (private credit);
and 2) deposit money banksassets as a share of GDP (bank assets). Source: Cihak et al.
(2012).
 Unempi;t: the unemployment rate. Source: World Bank Database.
 Openi;t: the degree of openness, dened as the sum of exports and imports of goods and
services as a share of GDP. Source: World Bank Database.
 Insq i;t: the quality of institutions. Source: International County Risk Guide.
Table A1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max
Growthi;t+1 (GDP) 776 3.030 3.610 -14.80 25.56
Growthi;t+1 (GDP per capita) 776 2.170 3.510 -14.42 24.38
IPRi;t 776 6.300 2.090 2.270 9.900
FDi;t (private credit) 776 0.870 0.500 0.080 2.620
FDi;t (bank assets) 776 0.930 0.480 0.110 2.630
Openi;t 776 0.900 0.710 0.160 4.430
Unempi;t 776 7.920 4.710 0.580 27.47
Insqi;t 776 5.800 2.150 1.670 10.00
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